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Kaemmerer: Kaemmerer: Three Strikes & You're Out:

Three Strikes & You're Out: The Supreme
Court's Reaffirmation of the Scope of
Judicial Review of Arbitrators' Decisions
MajorLeague BaseballPlayersAssociation v. Garvey'
I. INTRODUCTION
InMajorLeagueBaseballPlayersAssociation v. Garvey, the United States
Supreme Court affirmed an arbitrator's decision to deny a former major league
baseball player recovery from a settlement fund established to compensate
players who were damaged by collusion amongst team owners in the market for
free agent baseball players.2 In so doing, the Supreme Court reversed the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and reaffirmed the principle the
Court announced in UnitedSteelworkersv. EnterpriseWheel & CarCorp.,3 that
judicial review of an arbitrator's decision in the labor context is extremely
limited. The Supreme Court's holding was a correct and logical application of
the UnitedSteelworkers principle to the facts of the Garvey case.
HI. FACTS AND HOLDING
In the late 1980s, major league baseball was scandalized by charges that
team owners had colluded to control the salaries of "free agent" players.4 The
Major League Baseball Players Association ("Association") responded by filing
a grievance against the team owners ("Owners"), alleging that their conduct
violated the parties' Collective Bargaining Agreement ("CBA").5
A panel of arbitrators heard the grievance and ruled that the Owners had
engaged in collusion, causing extensive financial damage to numerous players.6
Consequently, the Association and Owners entered into a Global Settlement
Agreement ("Settlement Agreement"), which established a two hundred-eighty
million dollar fund for players who were financially damaged by the Owners'
collusion.! Pursuant to the Settlement Agreement, the Association designed a

1. 532 U.S. 504 (2001).
2. Id. at 505-06.
3. 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
4. A "free agent" is a player who has the right to contract with any Major League
Baseball team, rather than a player whose right to contract is restricted to a particular
team. Garvey, 532 U.S. at 505.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 505-06.
7. Id. at 506.
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Framework' under which individual players were entitled to file claims through
the Association to receive a portion of the fund. 9 Any disputes over a player's
entitlement to a payout were to be resolved through arbitration."
According to the terms of the agreement, the arbitrator's responsibility was
to determine "only whether the approved Framework and criteria set forth
therein have been properly applied in the proposed Distribution Plan."" The
framework set forth criteria that were generally applicable to all player claims
and established the specific requirements for lost contract extension claims.'
Such lost contract extension claims were valid "only in those [few] cases where
evidence exists that a specific offer of an extension was made by a club prior to
collusion only to thereafter be withdrawn when the collusion scheme was
4
initiated."'
Former player Steve Garvey ("Garvey") 5 submitted a claim to the
Association seeking damages. 6 Garvey, who retired from baseball in 1987,
contended that collusion by the owners prevented his contract with the San
Diego Padres ("Padres") from being extended to the 1988 and 1989 seasons.'
The Association rejected Garvey's claim and submitted the matter to
arbitration. 8 During the arbitration hearing, Garvey presented a letter written in
1996 by former Padres President Ballard Smith ("Smith") stating that the Padres

8. The purpose of the Framework was to establish a process for evaluating and
determining whether an individual player was entitled to money from the fund. Id.Per
the terms of the Settlement Agreement, before the Framework went into effect, the
Association was required to present the proposed framework to an arbitration panel for
independent consideration ofits contents and any player was allowed to file objections.
Id. The arbitration panel approved the proposed framework with amendments on

September 14, 1991. Garvey v. Roberts, 203 F.3d 580, 583 (9th Cir. 2000).
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. (quoting the Framework) (internal quotation marks omitted).
12. Id. at 584. The general criteria included consideration of the player's history

of compensation, recent performance, salaries of comparable players, etc. Id.
13. Id.
14. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n v. Garvey, 532 U.S. 504, 507 (2001)

(quoting Roberts, 203 F.3d at 584) (internal quotation marks omitted).
15. Garvey's career spanned nineteen seasons with the Los Angeles Dodgers and
San Diego Padres. A first-baseman, he had 2599 career hits and a lifetime batting

average of .295. Additionally, he was a ten-time All-Star.
16. Garvey, 532 U.S. at 506. Garvey's alleged lost-contract extension would have
covered the 1988 and 1989 Major League Baseball seasons and would have been worth
approximately three million dollars. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol67/iss3/5
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initially offered to extend his contract but later refused to negotiate with him as
a result of the collusion. 19
Nonetheless, the arbitrator denied Garvey's claim, explaining that there was
"substantial doubt as to the credibility of the statements in the Smith letter."2 °
The arbitrator noted that Smith had previously stated in another proceeding that
collusion among the teams did not play a role in the decision not to extend
Garvey's contract.2 Further, the arbitratornoted that Garvey presented no other
evidence corroborating his claims.'
Garvey sought judicial review of the arbitrator's decision.' The United
States District Court for the Central District of California denied Garvey's
motion to vacate the arbitrator's award.24 Garvey, however, found a more
sympathetic court in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which reversed the
district court by a divided vote.' The Ninth Circuit recognized that Smith's
prior testimony with respect to collusion conflicted with his statements in the
1996 letter,26 and, in the Ninth Circuit's view, the arbitrator's refusal to give
credit to Smith's inculpatory admissions in the 1996 letter was "inexplicable"
and "border[ed] on the irrational."27 Thus, while acknowledging that judicial
review of an arbitrator's decision is extremely limited, the Ninth Circuit found
that it was required to reverse the arbitrator's decision because he had
"dispense[d] his own brand of industrial justice."28
The Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the district court, which then
remanded it to the arbitrator for further hearings.' Garvey appealed the district
court's remand to the Ninth Circuit.3" The Ninth Circuit, again by a divided
vote, explained that its earlier ruling "left only one possible result [on remand]
...an award in Garvey's favor."'" The court's reasoning was that "[r]emand to
an arbitrator is inappropriate where such remand would be futile because [the
court] could not accord judicial deference to any other conclusion by the

19. Id. at 506-07.
20. Id. at 507 (quoting Garvey v. Roberts, 203 F.3d 580, 586 (9th Cir. 2000))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Garvey v. Roberts, 203 F.3d 580, 590 (9th Cir. 2000).
28. Id. at 590-91.
29. Garvey, 532 U.S. at 508.
30. Id.
31. Garvey v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, No. CV-97-05643-WJR, 2000
WL 1801383, at *1 (9th Cir. Dec. 7, 2000).
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arbitrator."32 Consequently, the Ninth Circuit ordered the arbitrator
to award
33
Garvey the amount he claimed, without any further hearings.
The Association appealed the Ninth Circuit's ruling to the United States
Supreme Court.34 The Supreme Court granted certiorari, and, without briefing
or oral argument, ruled that the Ninth Circuit erred because the arbitrator was
construing the parties' contract and acting within the scope of his authority.35
Therefore, even if the arbitrator made "serious errors," the Ninth Circuit was not
justified in intervening.36
The Court further went on to say that even when an arbitrator's award may
be properly overturned, the case should be returned for further arbitration
proceedings37 and a court should not decide the matter on the merits.38
Following its own advice, the Supreme Court remanded the case for still further
proceedings.39
Id. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. The HistoricalRole and Subsequent Evolution of LaborArbitration
The arbitration system is probably collective bargaining's greatest
contribution to labor law.' Arbitrators play key roles in the collective
bargaining system "by being the final arbiters in most of the contract disputes
that cannot be settled voluntarily by unions and management. In so doing they
have promoted the interests of employers in uninterrupted production as well as
those of employees in fair and equitable treatment."'"
In the early days of labor arbitration following the Second World War, the
subject matter of arbitration was largely confined to collective bargaining

32. Id.
33. Id.

34. See Major League Baseball Players Ass'n v. Garvey, 532 U.S. 504, 508-09
(2001).

35. See id. at 510.

36. Id. (quoting United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 38
(1987)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
37. Id. at 511.
38. See id.
39. Id. at 511-12.
40. See LLOYD G. RENYOLDS ET AL.,

LABOR ECONOMICS AND LABOR RELATIONS

257-60, 541-62 (10th ed. 1991); SUMNER H. SLICHTER ET AL., THE IMPACT OF

954-61 (1960).
41. Theodore J. St. Antoine, The ChangingRole ofLaborArbitration,76 IND. L.J.

COLLECTIVE BARGAINING ON MANAGEMENT

83, 101-02 (2001).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol67/iss3/5
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agreements. 2 Because "[e]xtemal civil law in the form of statutes and common
law court decisions rarely intruded" into arbitration proceedings, judges were
more than happy to avoid reviewing the decisions of arbitrators.43 Furthermore,
arbitrators and union and management officials thought judicial intervention into
labor arbitration objectionable because they "uniformly believed that judges
. . . did not understand the pragmatic and fast-moving nature of the labor
arbitration process."''
The autonomous role of labor arbitration began to change when civil rights
statutes and other laws aimed at protecting individual employee rights in the
workplace poured forth during the 1960s and 1970s." Thereafter, unions and
employers began to make these federal statutes issues during arbitration
proceedings." Consequently, arbitrators were forced to assume the additional
responsibility of ensuring that collective bargaining agreements did not violate
an employee's federal statutory rights.4
These statutory enactments created a problem because statutory
interpretation is a special responsibility of the courts.' When federal judges
noticed this development, they made it clear that they were not going to let a
private arbitrator get away unchallenged with noticeable misreadings of
legislative text.4 9 Thus,judges decided that some form of scrutiny was necessary
to correct flagrant and abusive arbitrator errors made in statutory interpretation. 0
Consequently, federal judges read Section 301 of the Labor Management
Relations Act"1 to confer jurisdiction upon federal courts and the courts began
to enforce or vacate arbitration awards.5 2 For example, in Textile Workers Union
v. American ThreadCo., 3 one of the first cases to address this issue, the district
court held that an agreement to arbitrate a dispute concerning the interpretation

42. See David E. Feller, The Coming End ofArbitration's Golden Age, 29 PROC.
NAT'L AcAD. OF ARB.

97 (Barbara D. Dennis & Gerald G. Somers eds., 1976).

43. St. Antoine, supra note 41, at 102.
44. Kathleen M. Paravola, Source ofLaw in LaborArbitration,in FAIRWEATHER'S
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE INLABOR ARBrrRATION 1,2 (Ray. J. Schoonhoven ed., 3d ed.
1991).
45. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2 to -16 (2000) (dealing generally with equal
employment opportunities including unlawful employment practices and enforcement
provisions).
46. Feller, supra note 42, at 121-26.
47. Feller, supra note 42, at 126.
48. Feller, supra note 42, at 126.
49. Feller, supra note 42, at 126.
50. Feller, supranote 42, at 126.
51. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (2000).
52. See Paravola, supranote 44, at 3-4.
53. 113 F. Supp. 137 (D. Mass. 1953).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2002

5

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 67, Iss. 3 [2002], Art. 5
MISSOURI LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 67

and application of a labor agreement could be enforced under Section 301.1'
Subsequently, in Texitle Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills of
Alabama,s" the Supreme Court clearly stated that Section 301 provided not only
the jurisdictional basis for the federal courts to preside over labor contract
arbitration clauses, but also the source of procedural law for labor arbitration. 6
In Lincoln Mills, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit had
held that although the court had jurisdiction over the suit, an agreement to
arbitrate could not be enforced because there was no federal or state common
law or statute that required or permitted such an agreement. s7 The Supreme
Court, however, reversed the Fifth Circuit and enforced the agreement.5 8 The
Court noted:
Other courts-the overwhelming number of them-hold that s 301 (a)
is more than jurisdictional-that it authorizes federal courts to fashion
a body of federal law for the enforcement of these collective
bargaining agreements and includes within that federal law specific
performance of promises to arbitrate grievances under collective
bargaining agreements. 9
After Lincoln Mills, it was clear that labor arbitration was going to change
dramatically from the autonomous institution it had once been.'
B. The Scope ofJudicialReview ofArbitrators'Rulings
Vacation, enforcement, or correction of an arbitration award begins when
a dissatisfied party files suit in a federal or state court" under Section 301 ofthe
Labor-Management Relations Act ("LMRA") to upset or modify a labor
arbitration award.62 "The guiding principle concerning judicial review of labor

54. Id. at 141-42.
55. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
56. Id. at 451-56.
57. Lincoln Mills of Ala. v. Textile Workers Union, 230 F.2d 81, 84, 88 (5th Cir.
1956), rev'd, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
58. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 448.
59. Id. at 450-51.
60. See St. Antoine, supra note 41, at 83.
61. "When such a suit is filed in state court, it is removable to federal court."
Steven R. Kinberg et al., The Award, in FAIRWEATHER'S PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IN
LABOR ARBITRATION 388, 388 (Ray. J. Schoonhoven ed., BNA Books 1991).

62. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (2000) ("Suits for violation of contracts between an
employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting
commerce as defined in this chapter, or between any such labor organizations, may be
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol67/iss3/5

6

Kaemmerer: Kaemmerer: Three Strikes & You're Out:
20021

JUDICIAL REVIEW OFARBITRATORS' DECISIONS

641

arbitration awards is whether the award 'draws its essence' from the labor
agreement." '63 In its seminal decision in UnitedSteelworkersv. EnterpriseWheel
& Car Corp." the Court stated:
[A]n arbitrator is confined to interpretation and application of the
collective bargaining agreement; he does not sit to dispense his own
brand of industrial justice. He may of course look for guidance from
many sources, yet his award is legitimate only so long as it draws its
essence from the collective bargaining agreement. When the
arbitrator's words manifest an infidelity to this obligation, courts have
no choice but to refuse enforcement of the award.65
In the same decision, however, the Supreme Court declared that "[t]he
refusal of courts to review the merits of an arbitration award is the proper
approach to arbitration under collective bargaining agreements. The federal
policy of settling labor disputes by arbitration would be undermined if courts had
the final say on the merits of the awards."'
Giving substance to this directive, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit said in Ludwig Honold ManufacturingCo. v. Fletcher:67
[I]f the interpretation can in any rational way be derived from the
agreement, viewed in the light of its language, its context, and any
other indicia of the parties' intention [it should not be overturned];
only where there is a manifest disregard of the agreement, totally
unsupported by principles of contract construction and the law of the
shop, may a reviewing court disturb the award.68
At this point, it seemed as though the Supreme Court had promulgated a clear
standard and the lower courts were properly applying the standard.
With the passage of years, however, more decisions setting aside arbitration
awards appeared than might have been expected in light of the Supreme Court's

brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties,
without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the
parties.").
63. Kinberg, supra note 61, at 396.
64. 363 U.S. 593 (1960) (union bringing suit to enforce the provisions of an
arbitrator's award when the employer refuses to abide by the arbitrator's ruling).
65. Id. at 597.
66. Id. at 596.
67. 405 F.2d 1123 (3d Cir. 1969).
68. Id. at 1128.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2002
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clear directive in United Steelworkers.69 As a result, the Supreme Court felt the
need to reaffirm the finality of arbitrators' awards. In United Paperworkers
InternationalUnion v. Misco, Inc.,7" the Court emphasized Congress' "decided
preference for private settlement of labor disputes" without judicial or other
governmental intervention. 7 Accordingly, the Supreme Court reminded the
lower courts that they "do not sit to hear claims of factual or legal error by an
arbitrator as an appellate court does in reviewing decisions of lower courts."72
All that needs to be shown for a court to enforce an arbitrator's award is that the
arbitrator has not ignored the plain language of the contract:
[A]s long as the arbitrator is even arguably construing or applying the
contract and acting within the scope of his authority, that a court is
convinced he committed serious error does not suffice to overturn his
decision.73
The Court proceeded to reverse the Fifth Circuit decision vacating the
arbitrator's award. 4
C. The AppropriateRemedy When the Arbitrator'sDecision Does Not
"DrawIts Essence " From the Labor-ManagementAgreement
In light of the general principle of judicial deference to arbitrators'
decisions expressed in United Steelworkers, courts have been reluctant to
remand a case to an arbitrator with instructions to enter judgment in one party's
favor when the arbitrator's decision did not "draw its essence"75 from the labor

69. See, e.g., H.K. Porter Co. v. United Saw, File & Steel Prods. Workers, No.
22254,333 F.2d 596 (3d Cir. 1964) (vacating arbitrator's decision because there was no
evidence in his record to support his finding); Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace

Workers, Dist. No. 9 v. Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp., 335 F. Supp. 212 (E.D. Mo. 1971)
(setting aside arbitration award because arbitrator disregarded clear provisions of labor

agreement in formulating order).
70. 484 U.S. 29 (1987) (arbitrator determining employee did not violate employer's

rule regarding use or possession of marijuana on company property, but district court
vacating the award and Fifth Circuit affirming, holding that reinstatement would violate

the public policy against operation of dangerous machinery by persons under the
influence of drugs).
71. Id. at 37.
72. Id. at 38.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 45.
75. See id. at 38.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol67/iss3/5
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agreement.7 6 The more common, and more appropriate, remedy is for the court
to remand the case to the arbitrator for further proceedings.' By doing so, the
jurisdiction of the arbitrator is deemed to be reestablished. 8
The Supreme Court clearly announced this general principle inMisco,Inc.79
In that case, thejustices noted that if a court "foreclose[s] further proceedings by
settling the merits according to its own judgment of the appropriate result," it
"improperly substitute[s] ajudicial determination for the arbitrator's decision."8
Such a substitute is improperbecause the arbitrator's decision is what the parties
8
bargained for in their agreement. '
IV. THE INSTANT DECISION
In Garvey, the Supreme Court considered whether an arbitrator's
application of the framework of a settlement agreement between the Major
League Baseball Player's Association union and team owners was within the
scope ofhis authority. 2 In so doing, the court revisited the issue ofthe scope of
judicial review of arbitrators' decisions.83 The Court expressly reaffirmed the
principle it promulgated in UnitedSteelworkers and its progeny and applied that
principle to the factual circumstances in Garvey."
A. The Scope ofJudicialReview ofArbitrator'sDecisions
The court began by stating the United Steelworkers principle that an
arbitrator's ruling must "draw its essence" from the labor-management
agreement." The labor-management agreement in Garvey was a settlement
agreement pursuant to which "the arbitrator shall determine only whether the
approved Framework and the criteria set forth therein have been properly

76. See, e.g., Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Indus. Union of Marine & Shipbuilding
Workers, Local 15, 242 F. Supp. 606 (D.N.J. 1965) (remanding award to arbitrator);
Winnebago Lodge No. 1947 of Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Kiekhaefer Corp., 215 F.
Supp. 611 (E.D. Wis. 1963) (remanding award to arbitrator).
77. See cases cited supra note 76; 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(5) (2000) ("Where an award
is vacated and the time within which the agreement required the award to be made has
not expired the court may, in its discretion, direct a rehearing by the arbitrators.").
78. See 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(5) (2000).
79. See Misco, 484 U.S. at 40 n.10.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id.
See id. at 45.
Major League Baseball Players Ass'n v. Garvey, 532 U.S. 504, 510 (2001).
Id. at 510-11.

84. Id. at 509.
85. Id. ("Garvey's right to be made whole is founded on that agreement.").
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2002
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applied."86 In order to state a claim for relief under the terms of the Framework,
Garvey had to provide evidence that a specific offer of extension was made by
the Padres prior to collusion only to be withdrawn when the collusion scheme
was initiated." As proof of a specific offer of extension, Garvey offered a letter
from Ballard Smith, the Padres former PresidentfChief Executive Officer, stating
that the Padres had in fact made an extension offer to Garvey only to withdraw
it as the result of collusion.88 The arbitrator did not find this letter to be credible
because of testimony that Smith gave in the 1986 collusion proceedings in which
he stated that the Padres were not interested in continuing Garvey's contract in
1986 and that there had been no collusion.89
The Supreme Court noted that the arbitrator's credibility determination was
unquestionably a factual finding.0 When the arbitrator made the credibility
determination, however, he was construing the terms of the settlement agreement
by applying the criteria set forth in the Framework.91 Thus, the arbitrator was
performing the exact function that the Settlement Agreement set forth for him.
Therefore, the Ninth Circuit erroneously overturned the arbitrator's decision
merely because they disagreed with his factfinding.92 In reversing, the Supreme
Court held that, because the arbitrator's finding drew its essence from the
settlement agreement, it should not have been overturned.93
B. The AppropriateRemedy When the Arbitrator'sDecisionDoes Not
"DrawIts Essence " From the Labor-ManagementAgreement
In Garvey, the Supreme Court also considered what is the appropriate
remedy when an arbitrator commits serious error by making a ruling that does
not "draw its essence" from the labor-management agreement.' Accordingly,
the court applied and expressly reaffirmed the principle promulgated in Misco,
Inc. that the proper remedy is to remand the case to the arbitrator for further
proceedings not inconsistent with the holding reached by the court.9"
86. Garvey v. Roberts, 203 F.3d 580,583(9th Cir. 2000) (quoting the Framework).
87. Id. at 584.
88. Id. at 585.
89. Id. at 586. The arbitration panel squarely rejected the notion that these
statements were made for the sole purpose of supporting the owners' attempt to deceive
the arbitrators about the existence of collusion. Id.
90. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n v. Garvey, 532 U.S. 504, 510 (2001).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 509-10; see United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel &Car Corp., 363
U.S. 593, 597 (1960).
95. Id. at 511.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol67/iss3/5
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The Court did note that in the rare cases in which a court finds that an
arbitrator strays from the interpretation and application of an agreement and
effectively "dispense[s] his own brand of industrial justice," a court may
overturn the decision. 6 The appropriate remedy, however, is for the court to
return the case to the arbitrator for further proceedings."' It was, therefore,
improper for the Ninth Circuit to settle the dispute on its own by simply ordering
the arbitrator to enter judgment for Garvey without an opportunity for the
arbitrator to conduct further proceedings.98
Finally, the Court clarified that when parties agree to submit a dispute to an
arbitrator, "lilt is the arbitrator's construction [of the agreement] which was
bargained for."" In those cases, if a court enters judgment, it is improperly
substituting a judicial determination for the arbitrator's decision."° That, the
Court concluded, was what the Ninth Circuit did in the present case by ordering
In effect, the Ninth Circuit "usurped the
judgment in Garvey's favor.'
arbitrator's role.""0 2

C. The Dissent
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens began by agreeing with the
majority as to the applicable principles of law to the facts of Garvey."°3 He
declined, however, to join the majority opinion for two reasons. First, he
believed that the case law before the Court was insufficient to determine when
an arbitrator's finding "draws its essence" from the labor-management
agreement or what the appropriate remedy is when this is not what occurs.'
Second, Stevens objected that the Court declined to accept briefing or hear oral
arguments on the issues and reversed a fact-bound determination without
considering the Ninth Circuit's reasoning.'

96. Id. at 509 (quoting Steelworkers v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593,
597 (1960)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
97. Id. at 511.
98. Id. at 510-11.
99. Id. at 510 (quoting UnitedSteelworkers, 363 U.S. at 599).
100. Id.
101. Id. at 511.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 512-13 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
104. Id. at 513 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see United Steelworkers v. Enter. Wheel
& Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960).
105. Garvey, 532 U.S. at 513 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2002
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V. COMMENT

In Garvey, the Supreme Court applied the logic of UnitedSteelworkers to
affrm an arbitrator's ruling which construed the terms of a labor-management
agreement. 10 6 The majority correctly applied the UnitedSteelworkers principle
that a reviewing court should not overrule an arbitrator's decision if it "draws its
essence" from the labor-management agreement. 10 7 Applying this principle, the
Court in Garvey refused to overrule the arbitrator because he made a credibility
determination which was supported by the record.0 8 Given that this was a
factual determination, the arbitrator's ruling in this case "drew its essence" from
the settlement agreement between the players' union and team owners.'0 9
As late as 1972 an experienced arbitrator reported that most "losing" parties
did not attempt to have awards vacated: "[N]early all labor arbitration is
conducted with the understanding that the decision of the arbitrator will be 'final
and binding.""' 0 This situation is undoubtedly what the parties desire in the vast
to be merely a way
majority of cases.' They do not expect the arbitration
2
litigation."
protracted
and
further
to
road
the
on
station
In the ensuing years, however, the rush to commence Section 301... suits
to vacate, modify, enforce, or revise awards had increased so greatly that former
Chief Justice Warren Burger expressed concern that these suits were clogging
the trial courts." 4 Burger stated, "remedies for personal wrongs, that once were
considered the responsibility of institutions other than the courts, are now boldly
asserted as legal entitlements.""' These developments made it necessary for the
Supreme Court in Garvey to reaffirm the doctrine of the finality of arbitration
awards.
The Supreme Court's holding should have an impact on both labor
employers and employees because it reinforces the doctrine of finality in labor

106. Id. at 510.
107. Id. at 509-10; see United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363
U.S. 593, 597 (1960).
108. See id.

109. Id.;see United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593,
597 (1960).
110. See Joseph Brandschain, Preparationand Trialof a LaborArbitrationCase,
18 PRAC. LAW. (Nov. 1972), at 17, 40.
111. See id.
112. See id.

113. See 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (2000).
114. See Warren E. Burger, Isn't There a Better Way?, 68 A.B.A. J. 274 (1982)

(report on the state of the judiciary).
115. See id.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol67/iss3/5
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arbitration awards. 16 The Court's ruling in Garvey reinforces the notion that it
7
should be extremely rare for an arbitrator's ruling to be overturned by a court.'"
With employment-related disputes consuming an even larger portion of the
courts' resources,"8 the attention the justices have placed on arbitration suggests
that they hope more disputes are resolved in this forum and apparently they will
encourage it. 119 Accordingly, the Supreme Court is sending a clear message to
unions and employers that if they decide to resolve disputes through arbitration,
they should not expect the courts to intervene simply because they disagree with
12
the finding.
The focus of a court's reviewing function is to ascertain whether the
arbitrator did his or her job; the focus is not to determine whether the arbitrator
did it accurately.12 ' Thus, all that is required is some support in the record for the
arbitrator's decision.' " When the court finds some support, the inquiry is
over." 3 Even if a court finds the arbitrator's factual analysis, such as credibility
determinations, to be unpersuasive, the decision hardly qualifies as serious error,
let alone an irrational or inexplicable error. 24 The bargain for arbitration implies

116. See Kinberg, supra note 61, at 400.
117. See Kinberg, supra note 61, at 400.
118. During the 2000-01 term, the Supreme Court heard four arbitration cases in
addition to Garvey. See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001) (holding
that Section 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"), which excludes from coverage
"contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class ofworkers
engaged in foreign or interstate commerce," is confined to transportation workers only);
C & L Enters, Inc. v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla., 532 U.S. 411
(2001) (holding that where an Indian tribe agreed to arbitrate contractual disputes with
a company, it subjected itself to Oklahoma law and thus agreed to the enforcement of
awards in courts having jurisdiction over Oklahoma law, thereby waiving its sovereign
immunity); Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000) (upholding
ruling that where an arbitration agreement between petitioner and respondent did not
specify who would pay arbitration costs, there was no justification for invalidating the
agreement because the risk that respondent would be saddled with costs so prohibitive
as to prevent her from enforcing her statutory rights was too speculative); E. Assoc. Coal
Corp. v. United Mine Workers, 531 U.S. 57 (2000) (upholding arbitration award which
required reinstatement of employee who had twice failed a random drug test).
119. See Editorial Comment, Assessing the Garvey Case andArbitration in the
Ninth Circuitand Beyond, 11 WORLD ARB. &MEDIATION REP. 107, 107 (2000).
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
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an acceptance of the limitations of the process, including periodic factual errors
12
by the arbitrator.
From a public policy standpoint, at least three distinguished federal
appellate judges have publically extolled the advantages of arbitration over
litigation. 2 6 They stressed arbitration's merits of speed, cost savings, and
relative informality.'2 7 Arbitration can be advantageous for claimants because
even if they can get to court, mounting empirical evidence indicates most of
them will prevail less often than they would before a qualified arbitrator.' 28
Employers also favor arbitration because successful plaintiffs typically29are
awarded more by a judge or jury than they are in arbitration proceedings.
Only time and experience will tell whether the lower courts will correctly
apply the principle of finality of arbitrator's awards as reaffirmed by Garvey. In
view of the Supreme Court's plainly stated ruling, it seems likely they will.
Thus, vacation of an award because it does not draw its essence from the
language of the parties' agreement will occur only when it is so express and clear
on its face that courts can be confident the decision is irrational or completely
unsupported by the agreement's provisions.

125. Id.
126. The judges include The Honorable Harry Edwards ofthe District of Columbia

Circuit, The Honorable Betty Fletcher of the Ninth Circuit, and The Honorable Alvin
Rubin of the Fifth Circuit. See Harry T. Edwards, Advantages of Arbitration over
Litigation:Reflections ofa Judge,35 PROc. ANN. MEETING,NAT'LACAD. ARB. 16,26-27
(James L. Stem & Barbara D. Dennis eds., 1982); Betty Binns Fletcher, Arbitration of
Title VII Claims: Some JudicialPerceptions,34 PRoc. ANN. MEETING, NAT'L ACAD.
ARB. 218, 228 (James L. Stem & Barbara D. Dennis eds., 1981); Alvin D. Rubin,
Arbitration: Toward a Rebirth, in Truth, Lie Detectors,and Other Problems in Labor
Arbitration, 31 PRoc. ANN. MEETING, NAT'L ACAD. ARB. 30, 36 (James L. Stem &
Barbara D. Dennis eds., 1978).
127. See Rubin, supra note 126, at 36.
128. See Lewis L. Maltby, Private Justice: Employment Arbitration and Civil
Rights, 30 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REv. 29, 46, 49 (1998). In a study by the American
Arbitration Association, arbitral claimants prevailed sixty-three percent of the time. See
id. at 48-49. By contrast, plaintiffs' success rate in separate surveys offederal court and
EEOC cases was only 14.9% and 16.8%, respectively. See id.
129. See id. at 54.
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VI. CONCLUSION

The legal principle guiding judicial review of arbitration awards is relatively
straightforward. A court is justified in overturning an arbitrator's findings only
when the award does not "find its essence" from the collective bargaining
agreement. 130 It was necessary, however, for the Court to reaffirm this principle
in Garvey because the lower courts' application of this principle to the facts of
cases before them had been less than exemplary. The Supreme Court in Garvey
made it clear that when a court simply disagrees with an arbitrator's factual
finding, it is not appropriate for the court to intervene; the arbitrator's
construction of the agreement was specifically bargained for as part of the labormanagement agreement.
Additionally, it was necessary for the Supreme Court in Garvey to reaffirm
the appropriate remedy when an arbitrator's decision does not "draw its essence"
from the agreement. The Court made it extremely clear that in the rare cases in
which an arbitrator's award may properly be vacated, the appropriate remedy is
to remand the case for further arbitration proceedings rather than substituting a
judicial determination for the arbitrator's ruling and, thereby, taking over the
arbitrator's role.
BRYAN M. KAEMMERER

130. See Major League Baseball Players Ass'n v. Garvey, 532 U.S. 504, 511
(2001); United Steelworkers v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960).
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